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Pros
 Employees work harder when incentives are 
described as entitlements that can be lost by 
failing to reach a performance target than when 
they are presented as extra rewards to be gained 
by reaching that target.
 Modifying the description of incentives has 
virtually zero inancial costs for irms.
 The way incentives are described does not seem to 
matter for the types of employees attracted by a 
irm.
 Emphasizing losses incurred as a result of failure 
does not seem to discourage employees from 
signing employment contracts.
ELEVATOR PITCH
Firms regularly use incentives to motivate their employees 
to be more productive. However, often little attention 
is paid to the language used in employment contracts 
to describe these incentives. It may be more effective 
to present incentives as entitlements that can be lost 
by failing to reach a performance target, rather than 
as additional rewards that can be gained by reaching 
that target. However, emphasizing the potential losses 
incurred as a result of failure may entail hidden costs for 
the employer, as it may damage the trust relationship 
between a irm and its employees.
AUTHOR’S MAIN MESSAGE
Linking pay to performance can be an effective instrument for increasing employees’ productivity. However, extra 
attention should be paid to how incentives are described. Experiments show that employees can be motivated to 
work harder under “penalty” contracts than under “bonus” contracts. This suggests that irms can reap productivity 
gains by simply adjusting the language of their employment contracts, at no extra inancial cost to the irms. However, 
employers must be mindful of ensuring that penalty contracts do not induce counterproductive behavior by employees 
that would have negative consequence for the irm.
Cons
 Penalty contracts are perceived as more unfair and 
controlling than bonus contracts.
 There is some evidence that contracts that 
emphasize losses lead to more cheating and 
corrupt behavior among employees.
 When contracts do not regulate all possible 
aspects of performance, penalty contracts may 
lead to a reduction of effort in the tasks that are 
not directly regulated by the contract.
 Penalty contracts are rarely used by irms, 
suggesting that employers may be particularly wary 
of their cons.
Employee incentives: Bonuses or penalties?
Penalty contracts lead to higher productivity than performance-based 
bonuses, but at the cost of employer/staff relations
Keywords: employee motivation, bonuses, penalties, loss aversion, contract framing
KEY FINDINGS
"Penalty" contracts lead to higher productivity than
equivalent "bonus" contracts
Source: [1].
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MOTIVATION
Evidence shows that people evaluate outcomes not in absolute terms but in relative 
terms, assessing them as either gains or losses relative to a reference point. Moreover, 
a consistent inding is that individuals are loss averse, i.e., they are typically more 
sensitive to the pain of losing something that they already have, than to the joy of 
gaining something they do not have.
In the context of employment contracts and remuneration, the concept of loss aversion 
can yield surprising insights into how performance incentives, such as bonuses, 
commissions, and perks, can be used to affect workers’ productivity. Usually these 
rewards are given once an employee has achieved a speciied performance target and 
evidence shows that such incentives are indeed very effective in raising performance. 
However, if employees are loss averse, it may be even more effective to modify the 
language used in employment contracts to describe incentives to employees: from 
presenting rewards as an extra incentive that can be gained by reaching a performance 
target, to an entitlement that could be lost if the employee fails to reach that target. 
Under loss aversion, the fear of losing a reward acts as a greater motivator than the 
attraction of gaining it, even if the economic value of the reward is exactly the same.
This emphasizes the importance of paying more attention to the way incentives 
are described to employees, rather than simply stating their economic value. As 
The Economist rather nicely phrases in a 2010 article, “economists have always been 
advocates of using carrots and sticks. But they may not have emphasized appearances 
enough. Carrots...may work better if they can somehow be made to look like sticks.” 
In other words, irms could reap productivity gains by simple, and virtually costless, 
modiications of the language they use in their employment contracts. Thus instead 
of emphasizing the positive consequences of success, contracts could highlight the 
negative consequences of performance failure, while keeping constant the economic 
value of the incentives.
DISCUSSION OF PROS AND CONS
The productivity gains of “carrots that look like sticks”
Can irms actually boost productivity by using “carrots that look like sticks”? In one of 
the irst studies to address this question, 68 MBA students were invited to take part 
in a paid research experiment where they were asked to act as employees of a ictional 
company [1]. Students received a monetary compensation on the basis of their choices 
in the experiment. They had to choose a number representing how hard they wanted 
to work for the company. Higher numbers (i.e. higher effort) made it more likely that 
the irm could meet a desired production target. However, higher effort was also 
more costly for the employee (i.e. a larger monetary sum would be subtracted from 
their inal compensation). Students were randomly assigned to one of two payment 
conditions. In the “bonus” condition, students were paid a base salary of $20 plus a 
bonus of $10 if the irm met the desired production target. In the “penalty” condition, 
students were paid a base salary of $30 minus a $10 penalty if the irm did not meet 
the target. The two conditions are objectively equivalent: in either case, the employee 
receives $30 if the target is met and $20 if it is not. However, the language used in the 
contracts differs: incentives are presented as “carrots” in the bonus condition and as 
“sticks” in the penalty condition.
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The results of the experiment are striking. Despite the economic equivalence of the 
two contracts, employees in the penalty condition worked harder than those in the 
bonus condition, and the size of the effect was large. In the bonus condition students, 
on average, worked at 57% of maximum possible productivity. In the penalty condition 
they worked at 74% of maximum possible productivity. Therefore, productivity 
improved by 17 percentage points under the penalty contract (see the illustration on 
p.1).
However, one could be skeptical about whether indings from such an artiicial 
experimental study, conducted with students and relatively low monetary stakes, can 
be trusted to represent what motivates employees in actual labor markets. Do these 
results transfer to real-world workplaces, where actual employees work for substantial 
amounts of money? A recent study shows that this is indeed the case [2].
The study was conducted in a natural workplace in collaboration with the managers 
of a Chinese electronics company who wished to investigate the effectiveness of 
various incentive schemes for increasing productivity in their irm. For a period of 
four weeks, workers were offered a monetary bonus for achieving a pre-determined 
productivity target. The weekly bonus was sizeable and amounted to more than 20% 
of the weekly salary of the highest-paid worker in the company. The incentive scheme 
was announced to workers by the company in a letter, and workers were unaware that 
they were taking part in a research study.
About half of the workers were told that they would earn RMB 80 for each week in 
which they had met the weekly productivity target. The other half of the workers were 
instead told that they had been provisionally assigned a bonus of RMB 320. However, 
for each week in which their performance failed to meet the target, the bonus would 
be reduced by RMB 80. Both groups were paid the corresponding bonuses at the end 
of the fourth week of the scheme. The economic incentives offered to the two groups 
were identical: under both schemes a worker meeting the productivity target in all 
four weeks earned a inal bonus of RMB 320. A worker meeting the target in only 
three weeks earned a bonus of RMB 240, and so on. But the incentives were described 
differently, either as bonuses or penalties, depending on the wording of the letter 
announcing the scheme.
The average productivity of workers assigned to the penalty condition was roughly 1% 
higher than the productivity of workers assigned to the bonus condition. Moreover, 
workers were between 2% and 9% more likely to reach the target under the penalty 
condition. While the overall effects on productivity were fairly small (and were only 
found for assembly-line workers and not for workers who had the task of inspecting 
products), it should also be noted that the manipulation was indeed minimal (e.g., 
workers in the penalty condition were not actually paid the lump sum bonus at the 
beginning of the period, but only told that they were assigned the bonus provisionally). 
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the productivity boost came virtually free 
of cost, since it only involved a minimal re-wording of the letter that the company sent 
to employees to introduce the new incentive scheme.
Overall, these two studies highlight how the language used in contracts can have 
powerful effects on productivity. Sizeable performance boosts can be obtained at 
virtually no inancial cost for the irm, by simply changing the presentation of the 
contract describing the incentives to employees. Several other studies have conirmed 
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these indings, both in the laboratory and in ield settings. The following section 
reviews this additional corroborating evidence in detail.
Further evidence for why penalties are better than bonuses
In a study conducted in Burkina Faso, 131 participants were recruited to spell check a 
set of ten typed exam papers [3]. They were paid a ixed base salary (independent of 
performance) and a variable salary that depended on the quality of their spell checking. 
While the economic value of the variable salary was the same for all participants, in 
one condition it was presented as a bonus payment for reaching speciic performance 
targets, while in the other condition it was described in terms of a penalty for not 
reaching the targets.
The results conirmed the superior performance of the penalty contract. Under the 
bonus contract, participants correctly identiied 81% of the spelling mistakes contained 
in the exam papers. Under the penalty contract they identiied 84% of mistakes 
(Figure 1). While this difference in performance is not as large as the one found in 
the laboratory study discussed earlier [1], it is nevertheless statistically signiicant. 
Moreover, this effect is robust to different cultural and geographical characteristics. 
The experiment was replicated with 228 students in Canada, where, again, the penalty 
contract signiicantly outperformed the bonus contract, yielding a three-percentage-
point gain in performance (Figure 1).
Similar results have been observed even in settings where the rewards for reaching 
productivity targets were non-monetary. In one study, 83 students were recruited 
to perform a task and were rewarded with a custom made T-shirt for reaching a 
productivity target [4]. In the bonus condition, the T-shirt was only given to the 
Figure 1. Penalty contracts boost productivity significantly relative to bonus contracts
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Source: Author’s elaboration of data published in Hannan, L. R., V. Hoffman, and D. Moser. “Bonus versus penalty: 
Does contract frame affect employee effort?” In: A. Rapoport and R. Zwick (eds). Experimental Business Research: 
Economic and Managerial Perspectives. North Holland: Springer, 2005; pp. 151–169 [1]; Armantier, O., and 
A. Boly. “Framing of incentives and effort provision.” International Economic Review 56:3 (2015): 917–938 [3]; and 
Imas, A., S. Sadoff, and A. Samak. “Do people anticipate loss aversion?” Management Science (Forthcoming) [4].
[1] [3] – Burkina Faso [3] – Canada [4]
Bonus contract
Penalty contract
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students who had reached the target after they had inished the task. In the penalty 
condition, all students were initially given the T-shirt, but only those who had reached 
the target could keep it, while the other students had to return the T-shirt at the end 
of the task. Productivity was on average seven percentage points higher under the 
penalty contract than the bonus contract (Figure 1).
Importantly, these effects have also been replicated in the ield, using actual employees 
in real-world labor markets. For example, a study conducted in collaboration with 
nine schools in the US implemented a teacher incentive program in order to increase 
students’ test score performance [5]. Teachers were rewarded with additional bonus 
payments depending on how highly their students ranked relative to their peers. Some 
teachers were paid this additional reward at the end of the school year once test 
results became available (bonus condition). Another group of teachers were paid a 
lump sum of $4,000 (the expected value of the reward, equivalent to about 8% of the 
average teacher salary) at the beginning of the school year. They were told that they 
would have to return some or all of the $4,000 if their students’ performance failed 
to meet the required targets (penalty condition). Thus, in both groups, teachers with 
the same student performance received the same inal monetary reward. When the 
pay-for-performance scheme was implemented in the bonus condition, the incentives 
did not produce any signiicant improvement in students’ test scores relative to a 
control group that was not offered any reward scheme. In contrast, when the scheme 
was implemented that paid the reward upfront and demanded repayment for low 
performance, this generated a signiicant increase in test scores.
Another study tested whether the superiority of penalty contracts over bonus 
contracts is sensitive to the type of monetary incentives a irm uses [6]. The study was 
conducted in China, in collaboration with the same irm at which the earlier study 
was conducted [2]. The conditions of the study were similar to the earlier one, except 
that the performance incentives were not assigned on the basis of a predetermined 
productivity target, but on the basis of relative performance. Workers were grouped 
in teams that competed against each other for a weekly bonus awarded to the team 
with the higher productivity. As in the earlier study, the incentives were described 
to workers using either a penalty or reward contract frame. Absolute productivity 
was slightly higher in the penalty condition, although the effect was not statistically 
signiicant. However, teams in the penalty condition were about 35% more likely to 
win the contest than teams in the bonus condition, showing that the frame of the 
contract also affects performance when the incentives are based on relative, rather 
than absolute performance.
The hidden costs of penalty contracts
The evidence reviewed so far shows that simple differences in the presentation of a 
contract can signiicantly affect workers’ behavior and produce considerable increases 
in productivity, at virtually no extra inancial cost for the irm. However, redrafting 
incentive contracts to emphasize losses instead of gains may entail “hidden” costs, 
which irms should take into account when designing incentive contracts. In fact, 
most irms tend to use bonus rather than penalty contracts, which may suggest that 
the use of penalty contracts could involve substantial drawbacks that employers are 
particularly wary of.
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Employees may dislike penalty contracts
One potential drawback of penalty contracts is that employees may dislike them. 
For example, if the superior effectiveness of penalty contracts is indeed due to loss 
aversion, then penalty contracts may be inherently less attractive for employees, in 
that failure to reach performance targets is more painful (and success less rewarding) 
than under economically equivalent bonus contracts [7]. Hence, employees may 
demand higher payments from irms to accept an employment contract that is framed 
in terms of losses than an equivalent contract framed in terms of gains. Additionally, 
the differences in contract frames may trigger differences in the characteristics of 
employees who self-select into employment. These potential “hidden” costs may 
offset any gains obtained by irms through productivity increases.
This issue was examined in a recent experiment [8] which was conducted on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk, a large online marketplace where employers can hire contracted 
“workers” to perform simple computerized tasks, such as data entry, categorization 
of images, and proof-reading. The experiment consisted of two phases. In both phases 
the researcher acted as an employer seeking workers to transcribe several text strings. 
In the irst phase workers were paid a lat fee to complete the task. In the second 
phase, taking place a week later, workers were sent a second job offer asking them to 
perform the task again. However, this time pay depended on performance: workers 
were told that they would be rewarded based on the accuracy of their work. Workers 
were offered two types of contracts: half of the workers received a contract framed 
in terms of losses, while the other half was offered an equivalent contract framed in 
terms of gains. The key question was whether the contract acceptance rates differed 
across the two conditions and, in particular, whether penalty contracts were less likely 
to be accepted than the bonus contracts.
The indings of the experiments were surprising: penalty contracts were actually more 
likely to be accepted than bonus contracts. The acceptance rate of penalty contracts 
was 25% higher than that of bonus contracts. Moreover, there was no evidence that 
the differences in the language used in the contracts triggered differences in workers’ 
selection: the workers who accepted the two contracts were similar in terms of ability 
(measured in the irst phase of the experiment) and loss aversion (measured using 
a standard experimental protocol). These results were corroborated by another 
laboratory experiment, which measured subjects’ demanded compensation for 
working under penalty or bonus contracts [4]. It found that subjects on average 
demanded a lower compensation for working under a penalty contract, although this 
difference is not statistically signiicant.
These results were not anticipated, as one would expect loss-averse workers to 
avoid penalty contracts. One study has suggested that a possible explanation for 
the puzzling result is that workers may anticipate the fact that they are loss averse 
and may therefore intentionally select the penalty contract as a commitment device 
that forces them to work harder and thus increase their chances of being successful 
[4]. While the mechanisms underlying these indings are not yet well understood, the 
available evidence indicates that selection of employees away from penalty contracts 
does not seem to represent a substantial cost that may stop irms from using the loss 
frame when designing their employment contracts [8].
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Penalty contracts may be perceived as too controlling
However, a number of studies have emphasized another potential drawback of using 
penalty contracts: that they may be perceived as being unfair and controlling, which 
may in turn make workers feel distrusted and insulted. There is now ample evidence, 
from a vast array of experimental studies, that feelings of distrust and unfairness 
can trigger strong negative reactions from individuals, who are often prepared to 
incur monetary costs in order to retaliate against those who have mistreated them. 
If workers feel they are treated unfairly under penalty contracts, they may retaliate 
against their employers by modifying aspects of their work behavior that may not be 
directly related to performance and productivity, but may still be of importance for the 
irms. Workplace theft, embezzlement, absenteeism, and sabotage are all examples 
of counterproductive workplace behaviors that can have harmful consequences and 
severe costs for organizations.
This leads to the question of whether the use of penalty contracts can trigger 
more negative and counterproductive responses from employees relative to bonus 
contracts. There is some evidence that this may indeed be an issue of concern. First, 
there is evidence that penalty contracts are, in fact, perceived as less fair than bonus 
contracts by workers. For example, workers who participated in one of the laboratory 
experiments reviewed earlier were also asked to rate the fairness of the employment 
contract they had faced in the experiment, on a scale ranging from “extremely fair” 
to “not fair at all” [1]. Workers who faced the bonus contract, on average, rated the 
employment contract as being fairer than those who faced the penalty contract. A 
similar inding is reported in another study [7].
Second, there is some evidence that exposure to penalty contracts may trigger more 
counterproductive workplace behaviors than exposure to equivalent bonus contracts. 
One study examines the impact of contract framing on the propensity for workers 
to engage in corrupt behavior [9]. The setup of the experiment is similar to the 
study conducted in Burkina Faso, which was discussed earlier [3]. Participants were 
recruited to spell check a set of exam papers, either under a bonus contract, a penalty 
contract, or a contract that offered both penalties and bonuses depending on the 
targets reached by the participant. In one of the papers, the experimenters had placed 
a monetary bribe and the message: “Please ind few mistakes in my exam paper.” The 
study found that participants who were offered the contract combining penalties 
and bonuses were signiicantly more likely to accept the bribe and found, on average, 
fewer spelling mistakes than participants who faced the other contracts. There were 
no differences between bribe acceptance rates and grading quality of the participants 
in the pure bonus and penalty conditions.
Another study examined the effect of contract framing on cheating [10]. A total of 
259 students were invited to take part in a laboratory experiment where they had to 
complete a task. Participants were given a sheet of paper with 20 pairs of matrices, 
each containing nine non-integer numbers. They were asked to ind, in each of the 
pairs, two numbers that added up to ten. Their pay depended on the number of 
matrices solved correctly within ive minutes. Some participants were paid at the end 
of the experiment, at a rate of €1.50 per matrix solved. Other participants were given 
a lump sum payment of €30 upfront, and they were told that they would have to give 
back any excess amount based on the number of matrices that they had failed to solve. 
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Participants’ performance under the penalty and bonus contracts was measured in 
two conditions. In one condition payments were based on the self-reported number 
of matrices solved: at the end of the experiment participants counted the number 
of correct answers on their own and reported it to the experimenters. They then put 
their work sheets through a paper shredder so that no one could verify their actual 
number of correct answers. In the other condition the actual number of matrices 
solved was instead veriied by the experimenters. Therefore, in the former condition 
participants had the opportunity to cheat by over reporting the number of matrices 
they had solved correctly. However, cheating was not possible in the latter condition 
because performance was monitored by the experimenters.
Productivity was higher under the penalty contract, both in the monitored and 
unmonitored condition. However, when performance was monitored, the productivity 
gain was small (about 2%) and statistically insigniicant . In contrast, when performance 
was unmonitored, participants under the penalty contract reported to have solved, 
on average, 76% more matrices than participants under the bonus contract. The large 
increase in matrices solved in the unmonitored condition relative to the monitored 
condition strongly suggests that the productivity gain was by and large achieved by 
cheating.
Penalty contracts and performance on tasks not regulated by the contract
There is also evidence that penalty contracts can have counterproductive effects 
on aspects of performance that are not directly regulated by the contract. In one 
experiment, participants were asked to perform two tasks [11]. In both tasks they 
were matched in pairs and were assigned either the role of “employer” or “worker.” In 
one task, workers had to select a portfolio of risky investments for their employer and 
were paid using either a bonus or a penalty contract based on the ex-post proitability 
of the investments. In the other task workers had to choose how many shares of a 
riskless investment to purchase for their employer. This second task was not regulated 
by a performance contract, but workers were paid a discretionary amount chosen by 
the employer. Workers were found to purchase fewer shares in the unincentivized task 
when the incentivized task had been remunerated using a penalty contract than a 
bonus contract. Post-experimental questionnaires reveal that the negative inluence of 
penalty contracts on workers’ performance can be attributed to the damaging effect 
that those contracts had on the trust relationship between employers and workers.
LIMITATIONS AND GAPS
The literature paints a mixed picture of the relative effectiveness of penalty and bonus 
contracts in encouraging workers’ productivity. While there is growing consensus 
about the beneicial effects of penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts, with 
corroborating evidence collected in laboratory experiments as well as in the ield, 
there is a more limited understanding of the potential drawbacks of penalty contracts.
A few laboratory experiments offer some evidence that penalty contracts may impair 
workers’ feelings of trust and fairness towards their employer, and that this can have 
counterproductive effects on workplace behavior. Future research should complement 
these indings with evidence from the ield to examine the extent to which these 
potential drawbacks play a role in actual labor markets.
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It also seems important to examine the long-term effects of penalty contracts. All the 
studies discussed focus on relatively short-term increases in performance, but more 
research is needed to understand whether the beneicial effects of penalty contracts 
can be sustained in the longer term.
The existence of potential drawbacks and the lack of understanding about the long-
term effects of penalty contracts may explain why employers may be averse to the use 
of such contracts and hence why penalty contracts are rarely used by irms.
SUMMARY AND POLICY ADVICE
A large empirical literature supports the view that linking pay to performance is highly 
effective in raising productivity. However, often little attention is paid to how these 
pay-for-performance incentives are described to employees. A number of laboratory 
and ield experiments have shown that employees can be motivated to work harder 
when pay-for-performance contracts emphasize the negative consequences of 
performance failure (“penalty contracts”), rather than the positive consequences of 
performance success (“bonus contracts”). This evidence suggests that irms can reap 
productivity gains by simple language adjustments of their employment contracts at 
virtually no extra inancial cost.
However, there is also evidence that there may be hidden costs in the use of penalty 
contracts, as they may damage the trust environment of an organization, which 
may induce employees to engage in counterproductive workplace behaviors that 
can have harmful consequences for the irm. However, more evidence is needed on 
these potential drawbacks of penalty contracts to improve our understanding of their 
costs.
The long-term effects of penalty contracts are also not yet well understood. Overall, 
this suggests that penalty contracts should be used with caution and that irms should 
closely monitor employees’ levels of satisfaction and perceptions of fairness when 
using this type of contract, in order to promptly identify any impairments of the trust 
environment that may potentially offset any productivity advantage of the penalty 
contract.
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